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Introduction 
The world of work has become less predictable and 
more uncertain for organizations. To deal with this 
situation and to help ensure their survival and growth, 
firms in recent years have heightened their interest in 
strategic planning [1]. Furthermore, research has found a 
generally positive relationship between strategic 
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Abstract   
SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis is probably used more often than any other management technique in 
strategic decision making. There appears to be a greater emphasis, however, on identifying strengths and opportunities while 
weaknesses and threats are examined less closely. Such bias may be problematic because firms may overlook single points of failure 
(SPOFs), which are elements that, upon malfunction, render an entire system unavailable or unreliable. These threats and weaknesses are most often 
presented in information technology and engineering discussions of equipment, machine, and device breakdowns, but may have applicability in a 
number of other areas important to organizations including people; materials and supplies; methods and processes; and shock events—natural 
and human-made disasters. To be resilient in today’s 24-7, 365 days a year global business world, it is critical that organizations 
effectively anticipate, evaluate, prepare for, and mitigate SPOF risks that can have a seriously negative impact on a firm’s 
performance. The paper concludes with a three-step approach to help managers reduce and effectively respond to SPOFs. Companies 
that integrate the concept of SPOFs into their strategic planning could develop high-impact management skill, leading to improved 
corporate profitability. 
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planning and performance [2, 3, 4]. 
One strategic management planning technique widely 
used in industry and extensively taught in business 
schools is SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats) analysis which focuses on 
the examination of a business’s internal and external 
environment with the aim of identifying internal 
strengths in order to take advantage of its external 
opportunities and avoid external threats, while 
addressing the business’s weaknesses [5, 6]. 
Some research suggests that in performing SWOT 
analyses executives in firms tend to emphasize strengths 
and opportunities over weaknesses and threats [7]. This 
is consistent with findings that management tends to 
highlight good news more than bad news [8] that risks 
tend to be underestimated [9] that people’s estimations 
of the future are often unrealistically optimistic [10, 11] 
and that most individuals have a slightly positive bias 
[12, 13]. There is even evidence that humans may be 
hard-wired for optimism [14]. 
While optimism, even mildly distorted positive 
perceptions,may be adaptive [15, 16]
 
and is highly 
promoted in America [17], any advantage arising out of 
unrealistic optimism is likely to come at a cost. For 
example, an unrealistic positive assessment of financial 
risk is widely seen as a contributing factor to the 2008 
global economic collapse [18, 19]
 
and findings from 
Hmieleski and Baron [20]
 suggest that entrepreneurs’ 
dispositional optimism may be negatively related to firm 
performance (revenue and employment growth). Also, 
Finkelstein [21] conducted a six-year, in-depth 
examination of 51 companies and found that executives 
of failed companies often clung to inaccurate views of 
reality that consistently underestimated obstacles. He 
noted that: “There was a regular lack of 
open-mindedness and devil’s advocacy. Instead, blind 
adherence to ‘positive thinking’ became a dominant 
corporate value that was often at the foundation of 
organizational failure” [22]. It seems that managers’ 
view of the future got in the way of the realities of the 
present, and when reality did surface, it was often 
whitewashed for reasons of face-saving and hubris. 
Thus, there appears to be an unwarranted emphasis 
on positivity in organizations and what may be needed 
is a more balanced SWOT approach which carefully 
examines weaknesses and threats confronting firms that, 
if not properly managed, become disruptive events that 
can escalate into emergencies, crises, or even disasters. 
This is exactly what a single point of failure (SPOF) 
analysis does.  
Consider the picture above as involving a SPOF in the 
following hypothetical setting. An information 
technology (IT) executive at Orbitz, the online travel 
and hotel booking site, looked out her office window 
and saw the pictured backhoe. The firm went offline 
shortly thereafter because multiple electric cables 
entered the same conduit outside the building and this 
backhoe took them out all at once when it cut the lines with a 
single scoop. The power of this backhoe serves as a 
potent reminder of how suddenly a seemingly innocuous 
and trivial factor can morph into a very significant 
problem. Squirrels, like backhoes, can also exert 
considerable influence. This was vividly demonstrated 
when NASDAQ’s entire data center was shut down 
because a squirrel chewed a power line [23]. Trouble, 
confusion, and chaos quickly developed at these 
facilities because of such incidents, referred to as a 
SPOF.  
While the idea and application of SPOFs is often 
presented in IT and computer applications, this paper 
will show that it has applicability across a number of 
organizational domains and should be a key 
consideration in firms’ strategic management 
deliberations as organizations conduct SWOT analyses, 
particularly weaknesses and threats. After a brief review 
of the definition of a SPOF, we discuss broad areas 
where SPOFs are likely to create problems and how 
addressing SPOFs in these areas contribute to a resilient 
organization. The paper concludes with a series of 
recommendations that could help improve management 
skills, thereby leading to stronger business performance 
and increased profitability.  
Literature Review 
Defining Single Points of Failure 
A general definition of a SPOF is a point in a system 
   
Ivy Union Publishing | http: //www.ivyunion.org February 10, 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 
1  
Page 3 of 22 Bergen CWV et al. American Journal of Management Studies 2014, 1:1-22 
where, if a failure occurs, there is no redundancy 
(duplication of critical components or functions of a system 
with the intention of increasing reliability of the system) or 
backup to compensate for it so a failure could 
incapacitate an entire system, process, or business [24]. 
A SPOF involves those critical items and points of 
contact that, if disrupted, often cause serious problems 
[25]. SPOFs are the Achilles’ heel of any organization 
and may significantly disrupt operations. They must be 
identified and contingencies developed so when a failure 
happens—and it will—organizations can quickly move 
to work around it.A dramatic example of a SPOF would 
be engine failure in a single-engine airplane.   
In industrial networking and other contexts, a SPOF is 
“a part of a system which, if it fails, will stop the entire 
system from working” [26]. It is a critical system 
(sometimes called mission critical) component with the ability 
to cease or severely impede system operations during a failure. 
Other examples of SPOFs can be seen in companies 
with single products, like emerging bio-technology 
firms that have yet to receive full regulatory approval. If 
they do not receive favorable treatment for their product 
then the SPOF becomes the regulatory process, which, if 
not approved, could be catastrophic for their investors. 
Or, businesses that have over-reliance on one customer 
or supplier or depend on short-term funding (which, in 
turn, is dependent on credit ratings issued by a few 
like-minded, like-acting companies), are subject to quick 
and dramatic ends to their existence if these keystone 
parties fail or walk away. Also, consider a commonly 
used construction design for a residential building where 
fan coils are installed in each apartment and a lonelarge 
hot water boiler for the complex is used. The heater can 
be considered a SPOF. 
Often times, firms can live with SPOFs on purpose 
due to resource limitations or opportunity costs reasons. 
If fixing a SPOF problem will cost a million dollars it 
might be better to accept that the potential down time is 
the better option if something goes wrong. Whether this 
is, or is not true in any given situation, is a complex 
business question much more than it is a technical 
matter [27]. 
Finally, it could also be that while there is some 
redundancy built-in the system there was also a failure 
to think things through properly [25,24]. For example, a 
firm that needed high online availability had two Internet 
suppliers to provide assistance should one experience 
problems and become unavailable. Unfortunately, both 
providers ran their cables through the same physical 
conduit and if one errant backhoe severed the conduit, 
this redundancy was rendered useless. 
SPOFs, identified as weaknesses or threats, are undesirable 
in any system requiring high availability during their stated 
hours of operation. Today’s businesses often require systems 
that are operational 24 hours a day. Indeed, Marks [28]
 
noted that “Enterprises of all sizes demand 24/7 
application delivery. Server failures, maintenance 
downtime, and bad weather aren’t excuses” (p. 43).High 
availability and reliability embody the idea of anywhere and 
anytime access to services, tools, and data and is the enabler of 
visions of a future with companies having no physical offices 
or of global companies with completely integrated and unified 
IT systems. If such systems fail the quality of the service 
or product provided may be significantly compromised, 
customer confidence lost, and in time consumers may go 
elsewhere for more reliable business [24]. 
Potential Single Points of Failure 
 
IT professionals might think of a pesky router that could 
fail causing an entire office to lose Internet access. This 
is a common and very apt example, but the point is to 
look beyond the obvious IT hardware that is typically 
associated with SPOFs. With this in mind, five broad 
areas where SPOFs can be identified are addressed. 
They are in no particular order. These include 
Equipment, Machines, and Devices; People; Materials 
and Supplies; Methods; and Shock Events as outlined in 
Table 1 and described below. Readers will notice 
overlap among some of the content areas as they are not 
orthogonal, and some information may actually be 
contained in two or more areas. A brief discussion of 
potential SPOFs in these areas follows. This is not an 
exhaustive list but should provide some key examples 
that firms may use to begin identifying such weaknesses 
and threats.  
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Table 1 Potential Single Points of Failure 
 
Equipment, machines, and devices Due to lacking redundancy/backup equipment 
People Lack of cross-training employees and/or succession planning 
Methods Caused by lean management, less inventory  
Materials and supplies Due to poor supply chains or scarcity of supply 
Shock Events Caused by nature and/or man-made crises 
 
Equipment, machines, and devices 
Historically, SPOFs have been identified with respect to 
equipment, machine, or device failure (e.g., transformers, 
power distribution units, and switches) in IT-related 
areas. For example, a typical laptop has one keyboard, 
one screen, and one CPU, all of which represent a SPOF. 
A set of dual servers with redundant hard drives and 
multiple network connections is built for 
high-availability, however, and so it would take a lot 
more to go wrong before a failure is experienced. 
Consider a recent example: “Southwest Airlines expects 
some lingering delays Saturday morning after a system-side 
computer failure caused it to ground 250 flights for nearly three 
hours late Friday night. … The computer system was ‘running 
at full capacity’ by early Saturday. Before that, though, officials 
used a backup system that was much more sluggish” [29]. This 
incident followed other airline computer difficulties. In April, 
2013 American Airlines grounded all of its flights nationwide 
for several hours due to computer problems. The airline 
ultimately canceled 970 flights. And in 2012, United Airlines 
had two major outages: one in August which delayed 580 
flights and another in November negatively impacted 636 
flights.  
SPOFs can occur in other, less technologically advanced 
areas. For instance, the owner of the lawn care company may 
have spare parts ready for the repair of the mower or edger, in 
case it fails. At a higher level, he or she may have a second 
mower or edger that they can bring to the job site. Finally, at 
the highest level, they may have enough equipment available 
to completely replace everything at the work site in the case of 
multiple failures. In sum, one machine equals a SPOF. 
Various engineering applications, especially reliability 
engineering, safety engineering, and quality engineering have 
been used to identify and correct SPOFs including Reliability 
Hazard Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, What-If 
/Checklist Analysis and Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA).The most widely utilized approach is 
FMEA which was developed during World War II and is 
recognized as an essential function in design from 
concept through to the development of every 
conceivable type of equipment. It is commonly defined 
as a systematic process for identifying potential design 
and process failures before they occur, with the intent to 
eliminate them or minimize the risk associated with 
them [30]. A detailed discussion of these engineering 
protocols is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.  
People 
An individual’s given skillset or knowledge set, if removed, 
can be devastating to an organization and may also be 
considered a SPOF. For example, if a firm had only one 
person who can control a critical server, then that person 
is a SPOF. If that same person suddenly has to take an 
extended leave or had something unfortunate happen to 
them, the organization may or may not be able complete 
the tasks associated with that critical server until the 
missing resource is replaced.  However, if the business 
had previously insisted that the key person train another 
individual or two, then the system could continue to 
function at some level without the original resource. In 
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this case, the enterprise has just built redundancy into its 
staff and eliminated a SPOF.  
Regrettably, all too often leaders allow people to become 
SPOFs. A human SPOF is a person whose absence (sickness, 
physical or mental disability, death, resignation, termination, 
moral incapacity, etc.) may endanger the well-being of a 
business. These are people who are in strategic positions and 
who have power over important aspects of an organization 
with no one else to replace them in case of a failure. 
Sometimes companies depend too much on one 
salesperson for their revenues and when he or she leaves 
the organization’s survival becomes problematic. 
Similarly, some organizational functions have been 
managed exclusively by one person within the firm 
without back-up of documented procedures or individuals 
cross-trained in the specialty.  
People SPOFs involve the information, knowledge, 
and skills they possess. It could be an employee—the firm’s 
top engineer or the individual who handles servers. If 
something happens to that person then the situation can 
quickly escalate to a disaster if the business needs passwords or 
system keywords or encryption codes to get its data or its 
clients’ data. It could be that one person in the organization 
knows the combination to the safe or the bank account 
PIN or the password. These SPOFs are probably the 
riskiest of all [31]. 
Human SPOFs also often happen in project 
management where a team member who is the sole 
possessor of critical knowledge leaves the project suddenly. 
Additionally, the research literature attributes the 
long-term failure of many downsizing efforts to its 
destroying organizational memory [32,33], often defined 
as the accumulated body of data, information, and 
knowledge created in the course of a firm’s existence 
[34]. To prevent this SPOF where someone’s departure 
or termination causes a subsequent hardship or 
disruption due to that person’s company knowledge 
(“He knew where all the bodies were buried”) the 
organization must ensure that no single employee knows 
all [35]. 
This may be particularly important from an information 
security standpoint where limiting access to knowledge 
and information is a key tenet [35]. When an individual 
possesses anything others require that he or she alone 
controls, that person makes others dependent on them 
and therefore they gain power and clout over others 
[36,37]. There is no doubt that information is a source of 
power [38]. Interestingly, these people SPOFs are often 
created by the individuals themselves in order to enhance their 
influence because of the information and the knowledge that 
they possess [39]. Remaining a SPOF is the goal of many of 
these persons because if no one else can do their job, they will 
have a strategic advantage over others and will not have to 
worry about their job security. Those individuals can be 
identified because they: 1) avoid documenting their procedures 
or information; 2) do not take off for holidays and vacations; 3) 
insist on being on call 24/7; and 4) keep their supervisors 
uninformed about their work activities [40]. 
Consider some examples. Imagine telling a global sales 
force that the business cannot pay their commission this month 
because the compensation specialist was sick. Likewise, when 
a purchasing manager was on vacation, vendors were not paid 
because no one in the office knew the detailed, but unwritten, 
procedures for paying these sellers. A university that had 
significantly increased its online presence using Blackboard, a 
Web-based learning management system designed to support 
fully online courses, came undone for some time because the 
lonein-house administrator of this course delivery system 
decided to retire on short notice to help care for her husband 
who was injured in an automobile accident.  
Executives should carefully review these aircraft incidents. 
Shortly after 4p.m. on a snowy January 30, 1980, a 
Kellogg Company aircraft crashed into frigid Lake 
Michigan just after an attempted takeoff at Meigs Field, 
Chicago, Illinois. Of the four advertising executives and 
two crewmembers aboard, one passenger and one 
crewmember were killed; the other four persons were 
injured seriously. The aircraft was destroyed [41]. In 
1981Texasgulf, Inc. lost six key executives when its 
corporate jet crashed at Westchester Counter Airport in 
New York and a 1987 crash of PSA Flight 1771 killed 
the president and three other managers of Chevron USA 
and three officials of Pacific Bell [42]. 
Such losses have prompted organizations to 
implement management succession planning [43] and 
for organizations to implement travel policies that might 
limit such SPOFs. For instance, at Northwestern Mutual 
Life Insurance Company of Milwaukee, the president 
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and only one of the three executive vice presidents may 
fly together and no more than three executive officers 
may be on the same plane. The policy also indicated that 
no more than six officers may fly together, and if the 
officers are all from the same department then the 
maximum traveling together is three [42].
 
This issue of human SPOFs can be raised by asking two 
questions regarding key people: “What will we do if ‘Joe’ wins 
the Lottery?” or “What will we do if ‘Josephine’ falls under a 
bus?” Such questions are euphuisms to describe a myriad of 
scenarios to consider in which each case the outcome is the 
same—Joe or Josephine, along with all of their skills, 
experience, and specific knowledge, are no longer part of the 
firm. 
Methods 
A third area where SPOFs might be located is in the methods, 
tactics, and procedures used by businesses. The continuing 
focus on operational efficiency and cost optimization 
has been a strategic priority over the last several decades, 
helping corporations lower the cost of manufacturing 
through outsourcing, off-shoring, and other practices. 
Cost reduction efforts have often outweighed other 
strategic priorities leading to vulnerabilities [44]. Here 
we discuss lean thinking and management, diversification, 
centralization/decentralization, and outsourcing. 
Lean management and thinking. Lean manufacturing, 
lean enterprise, or lean production, often simply referred to as 
lean management [45,46] is a production practice that 
considers the expenditure of resources for any goal other than 
the creation of value for the end customer to be wasteful, and 
thus a target for elimination. Essentially, lean is centered on 
preserving value with less work. 
Lean thinking embodies a set of design principles 
that guide an organizational to deliver its purpose more 
effectively while continuously improving service 
delivery, and systematically reducing all forms of waste 
and ultimately contributing positively to society. 
Pioneered in organizations around the world but maybe 
most famously in Japan, lean thinking looks at each 
organization as an inter-connected system. By providing 
a method for every department and person to work 
together to improve the quality of their work, and to 
eliminate everything that does not add value (termed 
waste and including rework, delays, errors, breakdowns, 
bureaucracy, etc.), the enterprise can systematically 
improve its business. 
Companies that once kept backup inventory in place 
may have exposed themselves to additional risk as they 
concentrated on working with fewer redundancies. One 
lean management technique is the just-in-time (JIT)inventory 
system. JIT (also known as lean production or stockless 
production) is a system in which component parts arrive 
from suppliers just as they are needed at each stage of 
production. By minimizing inventory, JIT frees up 
resources to employ elsewhere in the company. JIT 
began to be adopted in the U.S. in the 1980’s (General 
Electric was an early adopter), and the JIT/lean concepts 
are now widely accepted and used. 
With no stocks to fall back on, a disruption in 
deliveries to the business could force production to 
cease on very short notice—a SPOF. Such was the case 
with an explosion at Evonik Industries AG plant in Marl, 
Germany in March, 2012 which removed about 40 percent of 
the world’s 220 million pounds of annual Nylon 12 capacity, a 
high-performance and high-cost material having a precise 
blend of chemicals that resists reacting with gasoline 
and brake fluids. The JIT inventory approach practiced 
by many of these automobile manufacturers created a 
SPOF and this production shortfall at a single German 
auto-parts supplier created chaos in the global car business 
[47]. Perhaps there is room for not only “just-in-time” but also 
for “just-in-case.” 
Often lean thinking has been interpreted as the “doing more 
with less” imperative to reduce overhead, maximize 
efficiencies, and eliminate redundancies. Redundancy 
elimination has become popular in recent years [48]. 
However, this tactic can be problematic because 
redundant configurations (back-ups) have historically 
been employed to mitigate SPOFs [24]. Indeed, 
minimizing SPOFs through redundancy is a 
fundamental tenant of mission-critical elements and 
refers to an activity, device, service, or system whose 
failure or disruption will cause a failure in (business) 
operations and an inability to carry out its mission [49]. 
For example, the U.S. space shuttle had four back-up 
computers so as to eliminate SPOFs on the orbiter [50]. 
Support for redundancy was also indicated as critical 
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for the survival of the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (ASE). In a letter 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission Bloomberg 
Tradebook [51] noted “… that the events of September 11 
have taught us that we should reduce our reliance on single 
points of failure and that redundant, geographically dispersed 
facilities are needed to provide a sound systemic infrastructure 
for the securities markets and to ensure continuity in the event 
of a major, wide-scale disruption.” 
Finally, consider the sad situation of Land Rover, the British 
automobile manufacturer, found itself in when there was no 
redundancy or backup. In 2001, UPF Thompson, Land 
Rover’s only supplier of chassis for the Discovery SUV, 
declared bankruptcy protection. Land Rover was unable 
to predict the impending bankruptcy in order to take 
preventive actions. By some accounts, the director of 
purchasing at Land Rover had 900 accounts to manage 
and did not maintain a close relationship with UPF 
Thompson and eventually it demanded $US65 million 
from Land Rover in exchange for resuming chassis 
shipments [52]. The result was an out-of-court 
settlement payment from Land Rover to UPF Thompson 
to stop a delay in the supply of chassis shipments [53]. 
Does redundancy eliminate failure? Absolutely not! 
Redundancy serves as the response to when failure occurs, but 
one should never assume that buying duplicate components or 
installing dual processes is all that is necessary. In many cases, 
the systems are designed and installed without full analysis of 
the entire chain. This means the owner has made large 
investments in, for instance, costly additional power and 
cooling equipment and yet be vulnerable to one circuit breaker, 
valve, or other SPOF in the infrastructure that has either been 
overlooked or misunderstood. 
Moreover, built-in redundancy can be expensive. Consider 
the case of Morgan Stanley, the famous investment bank. After 
The World Trade Center (WTC) bombing occurred on 
February 26, 1993 in which six people were killed and 
more than a thousand injured, senior management 
recongized that working in such a symbolic center of the U.S. 
commercial power made the company vulnerable to attention 
from terriorists and possible future attack and thus launched a 
program of preparedness which involved three recovery sites 
where employees could congregate and business could take 
place if the WTC workplace was disrupted. As indicated by 
former President and COO Robert G. Scott, “Multiple backup 
sites seemed like an incredible extravagance on September 10 
[2001], but on September 12 [2001], they seemed like genius” 
[54]. Redundancy—planned and well-thought out—is not a 
bad word as some argue today! 
Diversification. Diversification is a second method 
presented. It was mentioned in the Bible as a valuable strategy 
some 3000 years ago: “Invest in seven ventures, yes, in 
eight; you do not know what disaster may come upon 
the land” [55]. Failure to diversify may lead to increased 
SPOFs. 
Diversification could be referred to as incorporating the 
idiomatic phrase, “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket,” 
meaning that an organization should not focus all its resources 
on one hope, possibility, person, supplier, customer, course of 
action, or avenue of success. If that one thing fails the firm will 
be “broken” and left with nothing (no eggs). Businesses should 
consider spreading their assets or eggs or anything else of value. 
Then it has a few baskets, and if one is dropped then it is not so 
devastating.  
The same scenario can be observed in personal financial 
investment and stocks purchases. If a person invests their 
money in a single portfolio of stocks or in a single project 
trusting that it would succeed, the investor is putting their 
money in a SPOF position. Such a strategy exposes investors 
to the risk of losing that investment. Hauser [56] reports that in 
the case of Enron, many employees had too much of their 
401k plan invested in Enron company stock when in 2001 the 
stock fell and lost almost 99% of value in six weeks. 
Approximately 11,000 Enron employees lost $1 billion in their 
retirement investment accounts. This is why it is important to 
diversify financial investments to avoid risks [57]. A well 
balanced portfolio of investments helps spread resources 
around in a way that will not cause any considerable financial 
losses in case the investment does not succeed. Moreover, 
some researchers have further argued that geographic 
diversification in one’s portfolio would generate superior 
risk-adjusted returns by reducing overall risk while capturing 
some of the higher rates of return offered by the emerging 
markets of Asia, India, and Latin America [58, 59]. 
As indicated earlier, geographic dispersion was advocated to 
partially dissipate SPOFs in the securities business [51]. 
Such geographic diversification will help eliminate SPOFs and 
may be particularly important after a disturbing event like the 
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eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull in April, 
2010 which caused chaos in supply chains the world over. As 
air traffic to and from northern Europe ceased, many 
companies sourcing from the region scrambled to make 
alternate arrangements. Nissan, for example, obtained 
pneumatic tire pressure sensors from only one plant in Ireland. 
When the airspace closed, planes could no longer service the 
Irish plant and Nissan’s supply of the sensors was quickly 
exhausted. The company was forced to temporarily suspend 
production at its plants in Fukuoka and Kanagawa, Japan and 
the disruption barred the production of several thousand 
vehicles resulting in significant unplanned costs [25]. 
The importance of geographic dispersion in minimizing risk 
and maximizing uptime was once again in play in October, 
2012 when hurricane Sandy devastated the Northeast 
(particularly New York and New Jersey) causing an estimated 
$68B in losses. Firms with multiple locations outside the 
coastal areas of New York and New Jersey were impacted less 
severely than those having only one location in the areas hit by 
the super storm or several sites all within the storm’s 
destruction zone.  
A key learning take-away is that if organizations are going 
to source mission-critical parts from any supplier—local or 
overseas—they would do well to make sure they have at least 
one alternate means of getting it, preferably from another 
geographic region. That, or pay to stockpile it close to home. 
Make sure everything is not hinging on one SPOF. These 
options to eliminate SPOFs cost money and time but 
compared to the cost of failing to deliver it may be money well 
spent.  
Another example of “geographical diversification” was 
illustrated by NASA’s design of space shuttle. Not only were 
catastrophic failures (SPOFs) minimized by spreading 
redundancy among several simplex circuit computers but these 
computers were also physically located in various parts of the 
spacecraft [50] so that a problem (e.g., mini explosion) in 
one location of the orbiter would not destroy all the 
essential components. 
Other SPOF problems related to diversification involves 
over-reliance on one customer or supplier. It can happen 
where, over time, the business derives most of its revenue or 
profit from a single customer. This can happen for many 
reasons, including, but not limited to having a great 
relationship with the customer, or doing business with a much 
larger customer. While this is natural in a start-up, overreliance 
on a single customer often puts the supplier company at high 
risk, as effects from economic downturns could have a 
negative ripple effect to the suppliers’ business. The risk is that 
if anything should happen to impair an organization’s ability to 
sell to this customer, its own business profitability is put at 
significant risk. Firms are well advised to review their 
customer list periodically to determine whether a significant 
portion of their revenue is earned from one customer or just a 
few customers. It is also prudent to have contingency plans in 
place for how a business should respond in the event such 
significant customers are lost.  
A business can also become over dependent on a supplier, 
for example, when a key part of a firm’s product is available 
from only one supplier. If that supplier stops producing it, an 
organization may be required to redesign their product to 
accommodate parts from other sources.  Consequently, the 
business is unable to continue producing and selling its product 
until this issue is resolved. Cash flow and profitability could be 
severely impaired. It is recommended that firms evaluate their 
suppliers periodically and determine whether alternate sources 
of necessary supplies or parts are available.  
Interestingly, this concern is seemingly at odds with quality 
guru Edwards Deming’s [60] suggestion that organizations 
“Move towards a single supplier for any one item, on a 
long term relationship of loyalty and trust” (p. 
23).According to Deming, multiple suppliers mean variation 
between materials and moving toward a single supplier and 
creating a strong relationship with that supplier will eliminate 
or reduce variation and layers of management that has to 
manage all the suppliers. He argued that robust quality 
arrangements cannot be adequately arranged across a 
multitude of suppliers. Deming’s advocacy of single 
source long-term relationships seems to conflict with the 
identification of SPOFs and the importance of having 
redundancies as a tool to eliminate them. Perhaps a 
compromise position would be to have a small number 
of suppliers with which an organization should develop 
close working relationships. 
Centralization/decentralization. Centralization 
involves the positioning of key departments, functions, 
and/or personnel at one place. It is where resources are 
consolidated in a single location and if damage occurs to 
that resource then all dependent systems are affected. 
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The primary advantage of centralized systems is their 
simplicity. Because all data is concentrated in one site, 
centralized systems are easily managed and have few 
questions of data consistency or coherence. Centralized 
systems are also relatively easy to secure, since there is 
only one host to be protected. Such a structure can be 
managed by a small team or an individual. The 
traditional argument for centralization was that it created 
economies of scale with lower costs, simplicity of 
implementation, and allowed specialization of tasks that 
improved staff efficiency [61, 62]. Moreover, 
administrative overhead is low because all changes, 
maintenance, repair, replacement, and security are made 
in a single location and such changes affects the entire 
system. 
The drawback of centralization is the system’s heavy 
reliance on a few central components; if the elements 
are disrupted, either accidentally or through hostile 
action, the system and its peripheral components are 
severely affected. Indeed, centralized anything can become 
a SPOF for all applications [63, 62]. Sony, Citigroup, and 
the US government are just a few of many organizations 
that have discovered that storing large amounts of 
sensitive data on single, centralized networks or in 
single databases while cost effective, makes them highly 
desirable targets for cyber-thieves. If the security 
protecting them has a SPOF, the personal or 
embarrassing information in those files may find its way 
to criminals, public websites, or other places where it 
could cause great harm. These may not be fatal events 
for those organizations, but they are bound to be costly 
and affect their ability to achieve corporate goals for 
quite some time [64]. Organizations that use centralized 
architectures incur significant vulnerabilities and the 
risks grow exponentially because of the SPOF inherent 
in such systems and because they present attractive 
targets for terrorists and hackers. “Centralized systems 
look strong, but when they fail, they fail catastrophically” [65]. 
As one commentator noted, I am not in favor of a 
centralized computing approach any more than I like the idea 
of having one huge power plant lighting up half a state— it’s 
just bad design, because there is no fault tolerance when 
everything relies on one provider [66]. 
In contrast to centralized structures, distributed 
systems often require several teams or multiple 
individuals. Administrative overhead is higher because 
the changes must be implemented in numerous locations. 
Maintaining homogeneity across the system becomes 
more difficult as the number of access control points 
increases. “Decentralized access control does not have a 
SPOF” (p. 27) [67]. If an access control point fails, other 
access control points may be able to balance the load 
until the critical point is repaired, plus objects that do 
not rely upon the failed access control point can 
continue to interact normally. In a decentralized set-up, 
multiple elements/factors need to be serviced and 
monitored individually, which increases costs. 
Decentralized data is more cumbersome, requires 
time-consuming maintenance, and generates higher costs than 
centralized storage—but has no SPOFs. 
  Outsourcing. A final consideration includes outsourcing 
which involves contracting out in-house functions to outside 
firms [68]. The strategy behind outsourcing is one where 
the organization focuses on its core competencies and 
then hires out the remaining business functions to 
contractors [69]. Core competencies are particular 
strengths relative to other organizations in the industry, 
which provide the fundamental basis for the provision of 
added value [70]. A key reason for outsourcing is cost 
reduction [71] and Domberger and his team found that 
organizations that outsource services are able to cut 
costs by about 20% without affecting service quality 
[72,73,74]. Another important reason for outsourcing is 
that it allows firms to focus on their core responsibilities 
and address more strategic issues [70]. 
It remains important, however, what kinds of 
operations and activities are outsourced. Some 
commentators [75, 76, 69]suggest that only non-mission 
critical services be outsourced including such activities 
as web site development/hosting, janitorial services, security 
services, courier services, payroll services, window cleaning, 
and catering. This enables firms to focus on their core 
competencies and mission critical activities whose disruption 
or interruption often result in the collapse of business 
operations. Unfortunately, Dorasamy, Marimuthu, 
Jayabalan, Raman, and Kaliannan [77]
 
reported that 
some firms are off-loading even their core business 
operations (i.e., mission critical) and are therefore 
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exposing themselves unnecessarily to SPOFs. They 
found in their study that 33% of core business 
operations were outsourced, representing a possible 
significant threat to firm performance. 
Kumar and Eickhoff [75]suggest that if a job, task, or 
function is a core competency it is still the possible that 
it can be outsourced, provided it gets through three tests. 
First, if the processes, equipment, capital, and 
employees are in place to deliver to customer needs, 
then there is no need to outsource. If it truly is a core 
competency, the determination of which is problematic 
for many firms [70], then the company should be able to 
provide value and should not give the business to 
someone else. Secondly, if the quality is sufficient to 
meet customer demands, the function should not be 
outsourced. Finally, one last exception to the core 
competency rule is that if the needs are short-term, that 
is, if the marginal increase in capacity provided by the 
supplier meets the needs for the organization, then 
outsourcing can still be considered. Regrettably, many 
firms do not go through such a systematic process and 
leave themselves open to SPOFs—the outsourced 
vendors and suppliers.  
A noteworthy disadvantage to outsourcing, particularly 
strategic functions, is that an organization is putting part of its 
company in someone else’s hands. Senior administrators have 
to ask themselves if the outsourced company can be trusted, if 
they think it will stay in business, and if they can adapt to the 
firm’s growing and changing needs. A clue from former Intel 
CEO, Andy Grove, on how firms should respond is indicated 
in the title of his classic text—Only the Paranoid Survive [78]. 
Shock events 
A shock event refers to “a sudden and unexpected event 
that may cause significant stress in individual 
organizations, seriously threatening their profitability 
and existence” (p, 616) [79]. Shock events refer to major 
happenings caused by either natural phenomena such as 
hurricanes or human-induced calamities like terrorism 
that create major disturbances in organizations. 
Adversities come, often without warning and it is 
therefore essential for companies to identify SPOFs in 
cases of shock events. What is needed is a focus on the 
need to be able to withstand the unexpected. 
While many companies plan for their financial 
growth and success, many do not take productive steps 
in advance to deal with such shock events and the 
SPOFs they often create. Considering possible 
scenarios and how best to prevent, prepare and provide 
interventions allows organizations to become better 
prepared to handle crises [80]. In scenario planning a 
group of executives set out to develop a small number of 
scenarios—stories about how the future might unfold and 
how this might affect an issue that confronts or threatens them. 
Schwartz [81] describes scenarios as stories that can help firms 
recognize and adapt to changing aspects of their present 
environment. They form a method for articulating the different 
pathways that might exist for it tomorrow, and finding 
appropriate movements down each of those possible paths. 
Scenario planning, as a strategy for crisis management, 
provides a mechanism to think through the different 
ways these scenarios could develop and the best 
business response. Through crisis management 
planning, organizations can be better prepared to handle 
unforeseen events that may cause serious or irreparable 
damage. Broad shock events considered here include 
natural and people-made crises. Such shock events need 
to be seen as important concerns for managers.  
Natural crisis. Natural disasters are presented in many 
forms—storms, floods, wild fires, mud slides, tsunamis, 
volcanic eruptions, pollution, avalanches, hurricanes, 
typhoons, and epidemics. No one likes to reflect on the 
possibility of a disaster. Yet disasters do occur and it is 
important to think about the factors that could impact 
business success before they occur [82]. A number of 
firms have been severely impacted by a recent spate of 
environmental disturbances outside the direct control of 
organizations. These issues can be considered SPOFs for firms 
and while not controllable can disrupt or suspend an 
organization’s (or plant’s) operation. Today’s business 
environment requires a robust review to deal with 
significant unexpected catastrophic events or incidents 
should they develop.  
Consider the following recent incidents reported by Morley 
[83]
 
and how far the consequences of such risks can extend:  
 Icelandic Volcano (2010)—Volcanic ash in the 
atmosphere shutdown much of Europe’s airspace for a 
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number of days, bringing significant disruption to air 
freight shipments 
 Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami (2011)—Earthquake 
brought severe devastation to utility infrastructures and the 
resulting tsunami brought longer term disruption to global 
supply chains due to many factories being flooded causing 
production to be halted 
 Thailand Floods (2011)—High tech supply chains were 
severely impacted by the floods in Thailand which 
resulted in the disruption in the supply of key components 
such as hard disk drives to the computer industry. 
People-made crises. On the other hand, people-made 
disasters appear due to the accidents and hostile acts, 
such as fires, arson, industrial explosions, cybercrime, 
computer viruses, union strikes, political upheaval, riots, 
insurgency, crime, terrorism, or war. The negative 
impact is obviously influencing the international 
economic environment. For example, the Asian 
economic crisis in 1997 had a profound negative effect 
on regional as well as international commerce.  
Or consider the March 18, 2000 ten-minute fire in an 
assembly unit at a supplier plant in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico which caused a supply chain crisis for the cell 
phone division of Ericsson [84]. Though the fire was 
small and no workers were injured, the assembly unit 
was in a clean room. The resulting sprinkler and smoke 
damage caused the assembly unit at the supplier plant to 
shut down for three weeks, and the unit required six 
months to return to 50 percent efficiency. The assembly 
unit operated without replacement equipment for years 
(i.e., no redundancy). Ericsson was solely reliant on the 
supplier for a particular component and, because of the 
lack of supply from the assembly unit, production of the 
cell phone at Ericsson stopped. What elevated this to 
crisis level was that the fire occurred at a booming 
market window, which Ericsson subsequently missed 
completely. The $200 million physical loss was covered 
by business interruption insurance, but this SPOF was a 
nontrivial contributor to Ericsson’s eventual exit from 
the cell phone business altogether [53]. 
Other people-made disasters might include political 
and social challenges. They are wide-ranging and have 
different impacts on organizations, depending on sector, 
geographic location, and type of operation. Some 
businesses are prone to social and political risk because 
of the location of their facilities, their product and 
customer characteristics, the nature of their employment 
relationships, or industry characteristics, etc. 
Well-known examples include Nike, Wal-Mart, and 
Shell, as well as the notorious social risks associated 
with industries like mining, footwear, toys, apparel, and 
chemicals. Also, varying social and political risks, and 
degrees of risk, affect companies located in specific 
countries or regions of the world.  
Political risk can generally be understood as 
execution of political power that threatens a company’s 
value including such actions as bomb threats, acts of 
terrorism, civil unrest, confinement or imprisonment of 
employees/family, legal or regulatory change; military 
coup; nationalization or unilateral expropriation, and 
kidnappings. 
Social risk, on the other hand, relates to the potential 
impact of such things as the infringement of the rights 
of indigenous peoples and challenges by stakeholders 
due to negative perceptions of business practices—all 
of which can jeopardize a company’s value [85]. 
Consider the social risks encountered by the following 
organizations: 
 Nike was accused of employing children as young 
as ten years old in Cambodia and Pakistan to 
produce sneakers, clothing, and footballs, leading to 
consumer boycotts. Most consumers did not 
differentiate between the company and its 
subcontractors; 
 Food and beverage companies have been associated 
with the obesity epidemic; McDonald’s has been 
accused of encouraging obesity through marketing 
its products and Kellogg’s has experienced 
reputational costs because of the high sugar levels in 
(particularly) children’s cereals; 
 Prescription drugs and their producers (e.g., Merck) 
have been linked to developing countries’ lack of 
access to essential medicines. HIV/AIDS drug 
producers were boycotted because they would not 
lower product prices in South Africa [85]. 
 
More recent shock events involve terrorism threats and 
activity. Acts of terrorism may be defined as “a 
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systematic and persistent strategy practiced by a state or 
political group against another state or group through a 
campaign of acts of violence to achieve political, social 
or religious ends” (p. 252) [86]. These shadowy, mobile, 
and unpredictable forces have become an integral part of 
business in the international context and may present 
SPOFs for firms. 
Materials and supplies 
One of the major factors affecting a manufacturing 
firm’s ability to sell its products is procurement of 
materials and shipment of supplies in a timely and 
cost-effective manner. Two key areas where SPOFs can 
surface in this area include resource scarcity and supply chain 
considerations. 
Scarcity. The world’s growing population, an increase 
in GDP levels, and changing lifestyles are causing 
consumption levels to rise globally—creating a higher 
demand for resources. Governments and companies are 
becoming increasingly cognizant of the scope, 
importance, and urgency of the scarcity of both 
renewable and nonrenewable natural resources including 
energy, water, land, and minerals. In a series of 
interviews to see what impact such a scarcity would have, and 
where, over the next five years, PricewaterhouseCoopers [87]
 
interviewed 69 senior executives in seven different 
manufacturing industries across the three regions of The 
Americas, Asia Pacific, and Europe. 
The study found that the risk arising from minerals 
and metals scarcity is expected to increase across all 
industries in the next five years. Among the minerals and 
metals on the “critical” list are: 
 Lithium: used in wind turbines and lithium-ion batteries 
in hybrid cars. 
 Beryllium: a lightweight component used in military 
equipment and in the aerospace industry in high-speed 
aircraft, missiles, space vehicles and communication 
satellites. 
 Cobalt: a material used in industrial manufacturing. Used 
in jet turbine engines and automotive rechargeable 
batteries. 
 Tantalum: used in mobile phones, computers and 
automotive electronics. 
 Flurospar: used in construction, cement, glass, iron and 
steel castings. 
Managing scarcity is about ensuring that the right 
amount of materials and resources are present in the 
right place in the right form. Two dimensions play a role 
here: physical, and political. Physical scarcity relates to 
the availability of resources and is affected by the 
depletion of non-renewable reserves and the sufficiency 
of renewable resources and stocks. The geopolitical 
dimension relates to the functioning of policy and 
involves such aspects as trade barriers, export 
disruptions, and national and international conflicts. For 
example, the Chinese government placed a restriction on the 
export of rare earth materials which effectively meant that key 
electronic components could not be manufactured. China 
holds nearly 90% of the world’s supply of rare earth materials 
at the moment which presents a significant SPOF for some 
organizations [88]. 
Supply chains. The interconnected web of suppliers, 
production facilities, and related systems used to 
accomplish this feat is globally referred to as the supply 
chain [89]. Many companies switched from “local” 
suppliers to “low cost” and often distant suppliers on 
the basis of cost optimization, without considering the 
cost of risks caused by this strategic maneuver. Larger 
companies today frequently buy from smaller suppliers 
in very remote areas of the globe. The extended supply 
chain now has many additional points of potential 
failure, requiring new approaches to risk management. 
Companies face longer logistics lead times as well as 
new and unfamiliar risk profiles encompassing natural 
disasters, epidemics, and social, political, or monetary 
instability. A global supply chain also increases risks 
related to supply chain integrity, compliance, and 
quality control. By stretching supply chains across 
borders, any small mistake or interruption along the 
way can easily become a crisis [90]. A crisis in a supply 
chain has the potential to put a complete stop to 
production and shipping [91]. 
Additionally, relationships with remote partners are 
subject to differences in business and cultural practices. 
Such risks are difficult to forecast and monitor, creating 
gaps in the risk management capability for most 
companies. Realizing the systemic nature of supply 
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chain risks, some companies are reviewing their 
purchasing strategies and practices, and rethinking the 
way they are doing business so as to not let a supply 
chain become a SPOF. 
A supplier may be affected by a customer in another 
market, as the customer difficulties trickle into their own 
market and cause supply chain disruptions. Unavoidable 
macroeconomic factors may also play heavily into the ability 
of suppliers to deliver. For example, in many markets, firms 
with mature and robust supply chains were subject to 
supplier bankruptcies and closures in the recession 
of2008/2009 [92]. To reinforce this concern one should 
remember the situation indicated earlier when Land 
Rover realized that a single supplier of their chassis 
declared bankruptcy resulting in a production stoppage. 
Civil unrest, shifts in government, and other similar 
situations may also have widespread effects on the 
availability of goods and services throughout a global 
supply chain [93]. Storms and other natural 
phenomenon may also disrupt shipping routes or prevent 
access to key ports and hubs. Moreover, the devastation 
of the 2011 Japanese earthquake/tsunami/nuclear 
disaster highlighted the need to look further upstream, beyond 
first-tier suppliers, to ensure that all the companies are not all in 
turn sourcing components from a single supplier. It is 
important to know and review a firm’s suppliers’ suppliers [94, 
95]. Many second and third tier suppliers of components and 
materials used to make components were shut down by the 
Japanese disaster. This was important because before the 
earthquake/tsunami Japan supplied 90 per cent of the world’s 
specialist resins used in the semiconductor industry. Felsted 
[94] noted that as a result of this catastrophe there will be a 
greater role for third party aggregators, which hold inventories 
for companies—but at a cost. 
To limit SPOFs in their supply chains firms should 
consider utilizing multiple sources. Maintaining multiple 
sources for a single component or product line can 
appear cost prohibitive in that economies of scale may 
be foregone. However, the return on that investment is 
realized quickly in a crisis. Further, the effects of 
purchasing power based on reduced quantities can be 
mitigated in a multiple source environment by using the 
competition among the sources as a leverage tool [96].  
These five broad areas highlight where SPOFs are 
likely to be located in organizations. This is not an 
exhaustive list and other areas may be identified. The 
idea is that organizations should periodically and 
systematically analyze these areas where risks due to 
SPOFs are greatest and develop strategies that mitigate 
their impact and in so doing create a resilient firm. 
Resiliency  
Mann [97] noted that everyone should expect all 
systems to fail at some point in time. For those seeking 
to better govern their organizations, the focus must 
therefore be on creating systems that respond well to 
problems—ones that break well. No organization 
operates without an occasional hiccup. The goal is to 
successfully manage these missteps—to be resilient 
which Horne and Orr [98] refer to as “a fundamental 
quality of individuals, groups, organizations, and 
systems as a whole to respond productively to 
significant change that disrupts the expected pattern of 
events without engaging in an extended period of 
regressive behavior” (p. 31). It involves the ability to 
bounce back from untoward events [99]. Greed, accident, or 
malice may have harmful results, but, barring something truly 
apocalyptic, a resilient system can absorb such results without 
its overall health being threatened.  
Resilience is about being able to overcome the unexpected. 
Researchers have identified several characteristics associated 
with resilience: the ability to face down reality [100], flexibility 
and adaptiveness [101], forward planning [102], improvisation 
[103], and skill in correcting errors and learning from them 
[104]. 
Facing down reality 
A common belief about resilience is that it stems from an 
optimistic nature [54]. That is true but only as long as such 
optimism does not distort an organization’s sense of reality. In 
adverse conditions, bright-sided thinking can actually be 
dysfunctional [17]. This was highlighted by management 
scholar Jim Collins who in his best-selling book, Good to 
Great [100], noted that superior companies practice this 
mind-set. Collins [100] discussed the Stockdale Paradox, 
named after Admiral James Stockdale, who was the highest 
ranking U.S. military officer held captive for eight years during 
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the Vietnam War. Interestingly, Admiral Stockdale indicated 
that it was always the most optimistic of his prison mates who 
failed to survive: “They were the ones who said, ‘We’re going 
to be out by Christmas.’ And Christmas would come, and 
Christmas would go. Then they’d say, ‘We’re going to be out 
by Easter.’ And Easter would come, and Easter would go. And 
then Thanksgiving, and then it would be Christmas again. And 
they died of a broken heart” (p.84) [100]. 
What the optimists failed to do was confront the 
reality of their situation. They preferred the ostrich 
approach, sticking their heads in the sand and hoping 
that the difficulties would just disappear. That 
self-delusion might have made it easier on them in the 
short-term, but when they were eventually forced to face 
reality, it had become too much and they could not 
handle it. Stockdale approached difficult situations with 
a very different mindset. He confronted the worst 
aspects of his current status with an optimistic faith: 
“You will prevail in the end, regardless of the difficulties. 
AND at the same time… You must confront the most 
brutal facts of your current reality, whatever they might 
be.”[105] 
The Stockdale Paradox suggests that firms as well as 
individuals must be ruthlessly honest in identifying their 
SPOFs yet maintain a faith that they can overcome such 
obstacles. Hamel and Välikangas[106] said it similarly in 
their discussion of resilient organizations:  “We must face 
the world as it is” (p. 56);and noted executive Jack Welch 
exhorted his managers to “Face reality as it is, not as it 
was or as you wish it to be” [107]. Believing that all is 
well is a self-deception which has no place in business. 
This analysis can begin by simply asking key 
organizational members to assess where the firm may be 
dependent with respect to the broad areas identified: 
People; Methods; Materials and Supplies; Equipment, 
Machines, and Devices; and Shock Events. If the answer 
is “yes” then the firm will have identified potential 
SPOFs and may be “putting all its eggs into one basket” 
where the business runs the risk of the entire enterprise 
depending on that one element, the failure of which may 
disable the entire system/organization. 
Flexible and adaptive 
A second characteristic of resilient firms is flexibility. 
Organizational success “… rides on resilience—on the 
ability to dynamically reinvent business models and 
strategies as circumstances change. … In the past, 
executives had the luxury of assuming that business 
models were more or less immortal. Companies always 
had to work to get better, of course, but they seldom had 
to get different—not at their core, not in their essence. 
Today, getting different is the imperative” (p. 53) [106]. 
By learning how to be more adaptable, companies are 
better equipped to respond when faced with a crisis. 
Resilient firms often utilize these events as opportunities 
to branch out in new directions. While some businesses 
may be crushed by abrupt changes, highly resilient 
organizations are flexible and thus able to adapt and 
thrive.  
Engaging suppliers and their networks in devising 
makeshift solutions to temporary disruptions is a flexibility 
strategy. So are policies that encourage flexibility regarding 
when and where work is done. Grobbler and de Bruyn [108] 
found that employees who are familiar with telework and 
virtual workspaces adapt more quickly and are more 
productive following a crisis. In addition, research studies by 
Leslie, Park, and Mehng [109] and Sheffi and Rice [110] 
demonstrates that flexible work practices contribute to greater 
employee resilience, productivity, and commitment, in 
addition to lower levels of stress. 
An example of flexibility and adaptation involved a 1997 
fire at an Aisin factory in Japan which destroyed most of the 
precision machine tools used to manufacture P-valves rear 
brakes to prevent skidding. Toyota got 99% of its P-valves 
from Aisin. As a just-in-time manufacturer, Toyota had only 
several days’ supply of valves in its plants resulting in twenty 
plants closing which forced a production shortage of 14,000 
cars per day. While the fire was still burning, Toyota and Aisin 
immediately collaborated to make emergency requests of their 
networks of suppliers. Aisin helped other suppliers improvise 
different production techniques, providing them with detailed 
plans and technical support. Two days after the fire, the first 
valves were fabricated and a week later, Toyota’s production 
line was back to normal, and five days of missed production 
were quickly made up. Two months later, Aisin resumed 
production at pre-fire levels [53]. 
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Forward planning 
Once SPOFs have been identified resilient organizations 
develop protocols to eliminate or attenuate their possible 
negative impact. Most corporations realize that the cost 
of effective risk management inherent in analyzing 
SPOFs is significantly lower than the cost of dealing 
with disruptions or failures. Forward planning measures 
pay for themselves many times over. In the context of 
heightened pressures on operating costs and the need to 
permanently improve business efficiency, the risk 
function will play a key role in identifying the best 
opportunities to rebalance operational efficiency with 
risk management. This is a key step to avoid 
unnecessary vulnerability in the operating model.  
Proactive risk management is a common characteristic 
among successfully managed crises. Such decisions are made 
prior to the beginning of a crisis and usually made under more 
desirable circumstances, with more time for deliberation and 
implementation. Those companies that anticipated the 
potential for crisis and analyzed the potential effects on the 
supply chain were better suited to mitigate damages and 
potentially gain from a crisis [53]. As with the other positive 
key characteristics analyzed, systematic risk management 
requires an initial investment based on the potential risk, but 
has a positive return in a crisis.  
Resilient organizations do not wait for errors to strike 
before responding to them. Rather, they prepare for 
inevitable surprises “by expanding general knowledge 
and technical facility, and generalized command over 
resources” (p. 221) [111]. If dependencies are identified 
then the organization can develop contingency plans to deal 
with several possible future events addressing these 
dependencies. As indicated earlier, SPOFs are often avoided 
by means of redundancy and in addressing these issues it 
might be helpful to recall that resilient organizations practice: 
“Redundancy: Backup, backup, backup. Never leave yourself 
with just one path of escape or rescue” (p. 92) [65]. Resilient 
organizations build in cushions against disruptions. The most 
obvious approach is the development of redundant 
systems—backup capacity, larger inventories, higher staffing 
levels, financial reserves, and the like. But those are costly and 
not always efficient. Improvisation may offer an alternative 
approach. 
Improvisation  
While planning is an important aspect of resilient 
organizations, as indicated earlier, prior theory also 
points to several reasons why improvisation can be a 
valuable and effective approach characteristic of 
resilient organizations and becomes a good complement 
to planning [112]. Vera and Crossan [113] “define 
improvisation as the spontaneous and creative process of 
attempting to achieve an objective in a new way. As a 
spontaneous process, improvisation is extemporaneous, 
unpremeditated, and unplanned. As a creative process, 
improvisation attempts to develop something new and 
useful to the situation although it does not always 
achieve this” (p. 728). Bruner [114] argued that such 
creativity is “figuring out how to use what you already 
knowin order to go beyond what you currently think” (p. 
183). 
Resilient firms imagine possibilities and display 
inventiveness in solving problems and encourage 
people to be creative and spontaneously to solve 
problems that arise all day long. 
Improvisation can be an effective choice when a firm 
faces environmental turbulence that requires action in a 
time frame that is shorter than a regular planning cycle. 
For example, Egge [115] describes how a salesperson 
might improvise when immediate action is required in 
the face of changing client demands; Dickson [116] 
suggests that fast learning and adaption without much 
advance planning are important to firm survival; and 
Moorman and Miner [117] describe how a team 
improvised a new product formula in response to a 
surprise introduction of a competitive product.  
Weick [118], however, worries that, because of the 
emphasis on spontaneity, researchers and practitioners 
may overlook the major investment in practice and 
study that precedes a performance, for example, a 
stunning improvisational jazz presentation. The observer 
may be unaware that jazz musicians have many years of 
experience learning the instrument, the standards, how 
to play together, how to blend a sound, etc. Similarly, 
improvisational actors learn exercises to develop the 
fundamental skills of listening and communication [119]. 
The point is that there is a foundation of expertise in 
improvising whether in music, theater, or management.  
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UPS tells its drivers to do whatever it takes to deliver 
packages on time. They encourage improvisation to solve all 
the small things that can go wrong every day. At the same time, 
they have clear rules and regulations, such as always putting 
their keys in the same place, closing truck doors the same way, 
making only right turns 90% of the time to save time and fuel, 
and so on. Those routines, combined with creative 
improvisation, allowed UPS to deliver packages the day after 
Hurricane Andrew struck, even to people temporarily living in 
their cars [120]. 
Learning from errors  
Resilient organizations are concerned with high reliability 
and have learned to deal regularly with challenging, disruptive 
events. They identify practices that tend to generate problems 
and review past difficulties as learning opportunities. They are 
obsessed with failure [104]. This often starts with after-event 
reviews (also called incident reviews, problem investigations, 
or after-action reviews) in which people compare what 
they did in a crisis to what they intended to do, why it 
differed and how they will act in the future. It is a 
learning from experience procedure that gives learners 
an opportunity to systematically analyze the various 
actions that they selected to perform a particular task, to 
determine which of them was wrong or not necessary, 
which should be corrected, and which should be 
reinforced. Individuals are asked to think about the 
event, project, or task, and systematically reflect on 
questions such as” What was supposed to happen and 
what actually happened and why, what worked, what 
did not and why, and what should be done differently 
next time. In sum, after-event reviews enable 
individuals and groups to reflect on their performance 
and to understand why objectives were not 
accomplished, to know what lessons can be drawn from 
their past experience, and to evaluate how these lessons 
can be quickly internalized to improve performance 
[121]. 
Conclusion 
Recommendations for Overcoming Single 
Points of Failure 
Firms have the ability to overcome or mitigate SPOF’s 
through effective use of established management 
techniques. These techniques outlined in Figure 1and 
described below can be important ways to improve 
overall corporate management, which could then lead to 
improved enterprise performance and profitability. 
Adopting these practices would seem to be in the best 
interests of corporate leaders, owners, and investors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The three-step process to reduce Single Points of Failure. 
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The fast-paced business culture of today often appears 
so focused on speed that caution and quality often fall 
by the wayside. Among the more popular trade 
magazines today is FastCompany 
(www.fastcompany.com). Just by its name, one can get a 
sense of today’s frenzied global business environment. 
Companies such as Federal Express base their business 
model (strategy) on speed, getting the product or service 
to the customer faster than the competition. 
However, being fast is simply not enough. When 
facing a surgical procedure, should a person prefer the 
fastest surgeon or the surgeon with the best patient 
survival record? Or in a business context, it is simply not 
enough for FedEx to be fast, but to also deliver packages 
to the right address and in excellent condition. 
Was it prudent for Edward Smith, captain of the 
ill-fated Titanic to order his ship to sail at full speed to 
arrive in New York ahead of schedule, contributing to 
the sinking of the ship? Both Captain Smith and Bruce 
Ismay, CEO of White Star lines, the owner of the Titanic 
believed the ship to be unsinkable and threw caution to 
the wind, resulting in more than 1500 passengers and 
crew perishing in the icy waters of the North Atlantic 
(www.Titanic-Facts.com). 
Outstanding companies seek to provide superior 
quality products and services and an important step in 
that process is to identify potential failure points and 
prepare for them. We propose a three step process 
beginning with forward planning, including risk 
management. Of course, the further forward one 
attempts to plan, the greater the likelihood of error. Risk 
management attempts to reduce or eliminate SPOF’s 
though, of course, the cost of mitigation must be less 
than the costs associated with failure. 
Effective risk management will sometimes call for 
redundant systems. The authors suggest judicious use of 
redundancy, only where high reliability is imperative 
and the redundant system is cost effective. For example, 
it would not make sense for an automobile manufacturer 
to provide a redundant engine in their automobiles.  
The second step is to be flexible and adaptive. 
Successful companies must be able to respond quickly 
to changing economic conditions or consumer 
preferences. This becomes especially important to both 
high-tech companies driven by technological 
developments and firms operating in the fashion 
industry, where consumer tastes and preferences change 
very rapidly. Companies with flexibility and that are 
able to improvise have been shown to be adaptive and 
often also excel at improvisation. Improvisation can 
only be found in those companies that build a culture 
that values and supports creativity throughout the 
organization. 
Being flexible and adaptive also means having a 
good contingency plan. Where reliability is crucial, a 
backup plan helps personnel to respond effectively. No 
plan can anticipate every contingency and it is not 
practical to have a backup for every possible failure. 
However, preparing and reviewing such a plan will 
serve to create awareness and to mitigate losses should 
a failure occur. Such a plan might include: an overall 
review of organizational priorities; curtailment actions 
for nonessential loads; failure scenarios and the action 
steps needed to mitigate each; and contact information 
for emergency/temporary equipment and support. 
Finally, good prevention techniques can help reduce 
SPOF’s. A company’s organizational culture should 
include knowledge management. Studies such as one by 
Jha and Joshi [122] emphasize the importance of using 
knowledge management as the basis for developing a 
learning organization. Knowledge management 
practices should not only include best practices, but also 
“lessons learned”, or knowledge learned from past 
errors. Some organizations employ “after action reports” 
to learn from errors and build their knowledge 
management base. Knowledge management and lessons 
learned must be documented to become a function of 
corporate knowledge. Likewise, management continuity 
helps develop sound SPOF prevention. 
Together, this three-step approach to managing 
SPOFs could be an effective means to increase quality 
and improve profitability. Companies that train and 
encourage managers to be aware of potential SPOFs 
and integrating these concepts into their strategic plans 
will not only be practicing better management, but also 
potentially be improving overall corporate performance 
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and profitability.   
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